A Terror Group: Defunct or Active? The Contradiction Inside the UN Security Council

A Terror Group: Defunct or Active? The Contradiction Inside the UN Security Council

(IN BRIEF) Evidence recorded in 2025–2026 challenges claims that Jaish-e-Mohammed has been dissolved, with a UN monitoring report linking the group to a November 2025 attack in New Delhi and noting organisational developments such as the creation of a women’s wing, indicating continued structure and activity. India maintains that the organisation remains an active cross-border threat and has shared assessments reflected in UN processes, while Pakistan has emphasised that banned groups are neutralised, a position aligned with demonstrating compliance with international sanctions, revealing competing strategic narratives. International analyses and earlier assessments have pointed to uneven enforcement of bans and the persistence of networks or safe havens, suggesting partial implementation of counterterrorism commitments. Financial tracking and sanctions enforcement are further complicated by differing national compliance levels, regulatory gaps, and geopolitical considerations that can affect listings, monitoring, and the disruption of funding flows. The situation exposes structural limitations within the UN sanctions system, which relies heavily on Member State reporting and lacks independent verification capacity, allowing contradictory accounts to coexist without resolution and raising concerns about credibility and effectiveness. Such ambiguity has implications beyond the region, including for the European Union, whose security frameworks and sanctions alignment depend on clear threat assessments, as uncertainty can hinder financial oversight, cooperation, and prevention strategies in an environment shaped by transnational networks, migration pressures, and digital radicalisation.

(OP-ED) ATHENS, 18-Feb-2026 — /EuropaWire/ — Despite claims of “dissolution,” the evidence recorded in 2025 and 2026 paints a different picture. The thirty-seventh report of the UN Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team (S/2026/44), released in early 2026, recorded that a Member State informed the United Nations of links between Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and recent attacks, including the deadly explosion near the Red Fort in New Delhi on 9 November 2025, which left 15 people dead. This reference does not concern historical activity, but recent incidents which, according to reporting by NDTV and The New Indian Express (February 2026), were attributed to networks connected to the organisation.

Beyond the attacks, the same report referred to organisational developments that are difficult to reconcile with the image of an inactive structure. Specifically, it recorded that Masood Azhar announced in October 2025 the creation of a women’s wing named Jamaat ul-Muminat, a development suggesting continued organisational cohesion and operational intent. These elements, also covered by Indian media in 2026, form a picture of continuity and adaptation — not dismantlement.

From an incentive perspective, India has consistently maintained that JeM remains active and has shared information with international partners regarding activities it considers to constitute cross-border terrorism. In 2026, India’s Ministry of External Affairs publicly stated that Indian assessments were “taken on board” in the final UN report, indicating that its position was not confined to political rhetoric but was incorporated into the institutional process. Under this lens, India has no apparent strategic incentive to promote a narrative of dissolution regarding an organisation it considers an ongoing security threat.

By contrast, Pakistan has repeatedly asserted in international forums that banned organisations have been outlawed and neutralised — a narrative aligned with the need to demonstrate compliance with UN sanctions obligations and Security Council requirements. Presenting an organisation as “defunct” can therefore function as a diplomatic tool of international image management. The coexistence of the two narratives within the same official UN document does not merely reflect disagreement; it reveals competing strategic incentives that shape how reality is recorded within the sanctions system.

Pakistan has repeatedly faced international scrutiny regarding the substantive enforcement of its legislation against banned terrorist organisations. Although groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammed were formally outlawed as early as 2002, subsequent international assessments have suggested that networks and support structures continued to operate within Pakistani territory. Notably, a 2023 U.S. Congressional report acknowledged that Pakistan had taken steps to curb terrorist financing and certain organisations focused on India, yet concluded that it had not fully completed its commitment to dismantle all extremist structures definitively and without distinction.

At the same time, international reporting over the past five years, as well as intelligence assessments, has referred to the continued presence of infrastructure or “safe havens” linked to organisations such as JeM, raising questions about the effectiveness of formal bans in practice. Meanwhile, although Islamabad announced initiatives such as Operation Azm-e-Istehkam in 2024 aimed at strengthening its counterterrorism strategy, international analysts have underlined that the implementation and sustainability of such measures remain subject to close monitoring and reservations. Taken together, these elements reinforce the perception of partial and uneven implementation of commitments, rendering the portrayal of certain organisations as “defunct” politically convenient, though not necessarily consistent with field-based assessments.

The financial dimension of Jaish-e-Mohammed cannot be assessed in isolation from the broader geopolitical and regulatory environment. The standards set by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and international AML/CFT frameworks presuppose uniform implementation, cross-border transparency, and effective tracing of transnational financial flows. Yet the effectiveness of these mechanisms ultimately depends on state compliance and consistency. Turkey, which remained under enhanced monitoring by the FATF until 2024 due to deficiencies in its counter–terrorist financing framework, illustrates how regulatory gaps can create zones of increased financial flexibility within the global system. At the same time, at the level of the UN Security Council, geopolitical considerations — including China’s historical positioning in listing procedures involving individuals linked to JeM — have shaped the dynamics of enforcement. In such an environment, where financial flows may transit through third countries and politically sensitive jurisdictions, the disruption of liquidity for organisations under sanctions becomes not merely a technical compliance issue but a geopolitical one.

This episode does not merely reveal a disagreement between states; it brings into focus a longstanding structural gap within the UN sanctions mechanism. The Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team relies primarily on Member State submissions and lacks independent operational capacity for on-the-ground verification or autonomous intelligence collection. The Security Council itself has repeatedly encountered political constraints in enforcement, as its decisions depend on the will of Member States and often collide with broader geopolitical considerations. Over the past five years, the Monitoring Team’s annual reports (2021–2025) have documented verification challenges, limited access to information, and divergences between national assessments, yet without a mandatory clarification mechanism. When contradictory national narratives are incorporated into official documents without institutional resolution or explicit assessment, the issue is no longer technical; it represents a structural vulnerability affecting the credibility of the sanctions system itself and, by extension, the effectiveness of the international counterterrorism architecture.

This institutional ambiguity is not a remote issue for the European Union. The EU largely aligns its sanctions regimes and terrorist listings with UN Security Council decisions, while European financial monitoring mechanisms, intelligence-sharing structures, and counter-radicalisation frameworks rely on internationally recognised risk assessments. When official UN documents contain contradictory evaluations as to whether an organisation is active or “defunct,” uncertainty emerges regarding the scale of the threat and the necessity of strict enforcement of restrictive measures. Such ambiguity may affect the assessment of financial flows, cross-border cooperation, and preventive strategy, particularly in an environment where diaspora networks, digital propaganda, and transnational movements operate beyond regional boundaries. In an era of heightened geopolitical volatility and hybrid threats, even limited structural gaps in the global sanctions system can translate into strategic vulnerability for European internal security.

History has demonstrated that terrorist organisations do not cease to function simply because they are described as “defunct” in official documents. For nearly a decade after the September 11 attacks, Osama bin Laden remained operational and protected within a complex network structure that survived amid international ambiguity, fragmented intelligence, and delicate political balances. This example is not historical exaggeration but a reminder of how underestimation or political management of a threat can prolong its lifespan and strengthen its momentum. In today’s environment, where the European Union must operate amid increased migration flows from Pakistan and Afghanistan, cross-border networks, and digital radicalisation, institutional ambiguity at the international level is not neutral; it translates into operational risk.

About the author

Dimitra Staikou is a Greek lawyer, journalist, and professional writer with extensive expertise on South Asia, China, and the Middle East. Her analyses on geopolitics, international trade, and human rights have been published in leading outlets including Modern Diplomacy, HuffPost Greece, Skai.gr, Eurasia Review, and the Daily Express (UK). Fluent in English, Greek, and Spanish, Dimitra combines legal insight with on-the-ground reporting and creative storytelling, offering a nuanced perspective on global affairs.

SOURCE: Dimitra Staikou